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COMMENTS

The Probative Weight of the
"Mainstreaming" Requirement Under

the EHA

We all "struggle throughout childhood and adolescence to be
included, not excluded; to be accepted, not rejected; to be
integrated, not segregated, to be invited, not isolated."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1975 Congress passed the Education of the Handicapped Act 2
(hereinafter Act) in response to the unmet educational needs of millions
of handicapped children.' The Act responded to congressional findings
that more than half of the handicapped children in the United States
did not receive appropriate educational services. 4 For instance, over
one million handicapped children were excluded entirely from public
1. Sharon Freagon et al., One EducationalSystem for All Including Children and
Youth with Severe IntellectualDisabilitiesand/orMultiple Handicaps,39 IL. CouNcIL.
FOR EXCEPT. CHD. Q. 18, 18 (1990) [hereinafter Freagon]. To acquaint the reader
with the sharp division in educational philosophy regarding "mainstreaming," this
statement of "inclusion" by Ms. Freagon can be contrasted with an introductory
quotation in an article by Sy DuBow, Legal Director of the National Center for Law
and the Deaf, Gallaudet University. Compare Sy DuBow, "Into the Turbulent Mainstream"-A Legal Perspective on the Weight to be Given to the Least Restrictive
Environment in Placement Decisionsfor Deaf Children, 18 J. L. & EDUC. 215 (1989)
[hereinafter DuBow]. "Championship prowess will sooner be attained if she concentrates on intensive training and learning to swim before she plunges unprepared into
the turbulent mainstream. When her strokes are stronger she will be able to make
better headway in the water." DuBow at 215 (quoting Grkman v. Scanlon, 528 F.
Supp. 1032, 1037 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
2. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-85 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991). Under 1990 amendments,
the Act is now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Act. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(a)
(West Supp. 1991). For a comprehensive historical overview of the Act, see generally
Judith Welch Wegner, Educational Rights of Handicpped Children: Three Federal
Statutes and an Evolving JurisprudencePart I: The Statutory Maze, 17 J. L. & EDUC.
387 (1988) [hereinafter Wegner].
3. John E.B. Myers & William R. Jenson, The Meaning of "Appropriate"
EducationalProgramming Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 3
S. ILL. UNTv. L.J. 401, 401 n.3 (1984) [hereinafter Myers].
4. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(a)(3).
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school systems,' and many of the children who were included in public
school systems had handicapping conditions which were overlooked 6 or
inadequately served.' To qualify for funding under the Act, States must
have policies which assure that all handicapped children have the right

to a "free appropriate public education." 8 Additionally, this free

appropriate public education must be provided, to the maximum extent
appropriate, in the least restrictive environment.9 This concept of least
restriction is commonly called "mainstreaming."10

5. Id. at § (a)(4).
6. Id. at § (a)(5).
7. Id. at § (a)(6); see also H. Rutherford Turnbull III et al., The Least Restrictive
Education for Handicapped Children: Who Really Wants It?, 16 FAM. L.Q. 161, 162
(1982) [hereinafter Turnbull] (The existing system was perceived as a "dual" system
which resulted in state school agencies' discrimination against handicapped children in
"special education" programs.); What Are Special Education Needs? 153 Loc. Gov'T.
REv. 406, 406 (1989) (The Warnock Report of 1978 recommended an overhaul of the
British special education system stressing that, whenever possible, handicapped children
should be educated in ordinary schools instead of special schools.).
8. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1). Subsection 2 further provides that:
(2) The State [must have] developed a plan ... which will . .. set forth in
detail the policies and procedures which the State will undertake ... in order

to assure that (A) there is established (i) a goal of providing full educational opportunity
to all handicapped children ...

(B) a free appropriatepublic education will be available for all handicapped children between the ages of three and eighteen within the State
20 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). See also 34 C.F.R. § 300.4 (1990). In
this context, the term "appropriate" is a term of art used to describe a "free appropriate
public education." It means compliance with the procedural requirements of the Act
in a program which confers some educational benefit. See infra notes 20-24, 36-40 and
accompanying text.
9. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (5). The least restrictive environment requirement provides
that:
(5) The State has established ...

(B) procedures to assure that, to the

maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including children in
public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children
who are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of handicapped children from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily .

. .

Id; see also 34 C.F.R. secs. 300.550-.552 (1990). The least restrictive environment
requires that a child be mainstreamed "to the maximum extent appropriate." In this
context, "appropriate" is used as an adjective to describe the extent to which a child
is mainstreamed.
10. For complete historical discussions of the Act, see generally Hendrick Hudson
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-84 (1982); Wegner, supra note 2, at
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In 1982, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to review the
Act in Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley." The Court in
Rowley developed a test to determine whether a child's educational
program was "appropriate" under the Act. 2 However, because the
plaintiff in Rowley was already mainstreamed into a regular classroom,
the Rowley decision did not address whether a child's placement meets
the least restriction mandate under the Act.13
Since Rowley, courts, educators and parents have struggled with
the weight to accord the mainstreaming mandate within an individual
child's placement. 14 Often, due to the nature of a child's handicapping
condition, a child's "appropriate" placement is not in the least restrictive environment. 5 Alternatively, one court has held that unless a
387. For a discussion of mainstreaming, see also infra notes 25-35 and accompanying
text.
11. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-07.
12. Id. A child's program is "appropriate" within the Act when the state has
complied with the procedures set forth in the Act and the IEP is "reasonably calculated
to enable the child to receive educational benefit." Id. See also infra notes 36-61 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Rowley.
13. "Because in this case we are dealing with a handicapped child who is ... in
the regular classroom of a public school system, we confine our analysis to that
situation." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204. See e.g., Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874
F.2d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1989); Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983); Thornock v. Boise Ind. Sch. Dist. 1, 767 P.2d
1241, 1244 (Idaho 1988).
14. Elena M. Gallegos, Beyond the Board of Education v. Rowley: Educational
Benefit for the Handicapped?,97 AMER. J. OF EDUC. 258 (1989) [hereinafter Gallegos].
Mainstreaming remains the most unsettled and unsettling issue. Perhaps this
is because the Court in Rowley did not address mainstreaming directly since
[sic] Amy Rowley was progressing in a regular classroom. Unfortunately,
some lower courts have used the Rowley opinion to undermine the importance
of the mainstreaming preference of the act. This issue may require a Supreme
Court opinion before there can be consistent treatment.
Id. at 283; see also, Community High Sch. Dist. 155 v. Denz, 463 N.E.2d 998, 1002
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) ("[Tlhe Rowley case did not discuss the circumstances under which
a school district's refusal to 'mainstream' a child would constitute a violation of the
(Act) .... Thus, the decision offers little guidance on the proper interpretation of the
'mainstreaming' requirement.").
15. See, e.g., Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. of State of Conn., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d
Cir. 1989) (weighing presumption in favor of mainstreaming against the importance of
providing a child with an "appropriate" education and holding that, due to the severity
of the child's handicap, mainstreaming was inappropriate); A.W. v. Northwest R-I
Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 164 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the mainstream placement in
favor of a segregated school placement because of the substantial cost to duplicate the
segregated program at the mainstream school and the minimal educational benefit to
the child at the mainstream school); Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Educ. Agency, 795
F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that segregated preschool program did not
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school district could not prove that the lesser restrictive program could
not be "appropriate," the child must be mainstreamed.' 6 This uncertainty has raised several questions. For example, must a child be placed
in the least restrictive environment if it is less "appropriate" than a
more restrictive. setting? Does Rowley recognize degrees of "appropriateness"? If two programs are deemed "appropriate," what weight is
or should be given to the least restrictive environment? What if the
parents and or the student himself prefer greater restriction? Does the
mandate for mainstreaming operate as a presumption, rebutted only
by evidence that a child will receive no educational benefit in the least
restrictive environment? 7 This Comment will describe the current state
of the law regarding these questions which continue to perplex educa-

tors, courts and parents.
In Part II. A. this Comment begins with a discussion of the
statutory language of the Act. Part II. B. follows by exploring the
approaches taken by state and federal courts in applying the Rowley
test where mainstreaming was the only issue. Following a discussion of
the general rule of mainstreaming, Part III. B. examines cases in which
two programs met the Rowley test for "appropriateness," but differed

in their levels of restriction. Then Part III. C. examines cases where
courts have differed in their application of the mainstreaming requirement. It will also discuss, in Part III. D., whether mainstreaming can
require neighborhood or home school placement, including a discussion

distinguishing "methodology" (the educational philosophy or pedagogy
used by a teacher or school district to convey educational knowledge)

from "mainstreaming." Following this discussion, Part III. E. will
analyze the role parents can play when saddled with the heavy burdens
of both production and persuasion in administrative hearings.
In Part IV., this article discusses the implications of the increasing

difficulty of judicial decision-making in the area of "mainstreaming."

meet the mainstream mandate, but holding that the Act did not compel a state to
establish an entirely new program to satisfy the mainstream mandate).
16. See Thornock v. Boise Sch. Dist. 1, 767 P.2d 1241 (Idaho 1988); see also infra
notes 102-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Thornock.
17. See Turnbull, supra note 7, at 169. As a general rule, integration of handicapped with non-handicapped children is a presumption which can be rebutted by a
showing that the placement is not appropriate for the handicapped child. This is a
middle ground between irrebuttable presuption and "unguided case-by-case" decisionmaking. Id.; see also Robert J. Goodwin, Public School Integration of Children With
HandicapsAfter Smith v. Robinson, "Separate but Equal" Revisited?, 37 MAINE L.R.
267, 289 (1985). Under Sec. 504 of the Civil Rights Act there is a rebuttable presumption
of illegality on a defendant who has segregated children with handicaps. Therefore, a
plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of discrimination and defendant would
need to rebut or integrate. Goodwin, at 289.
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As more programs in special education develop within each school
district, handicapped students are often finding that their "individual"
program may lie between the only two "appropriate" programs offered
by the school district; Rowley, then, is unenlightening. In these cases
the courts will appropriately defer to the findings of the state administrative hearings. In order to unify decisions under these circumstances,
Part V. urges the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to establish an
appropriate test for the weight to be given the mainstream mandate
within a child's individual program, particularly when the parents and/
or the child himself opt for greater restriction. In establishing the
appropriate weight, this author suggests that the Court adopt a factor
analysis to include: the decision of the state administrative agencies,
the Act's preference for mainstreaming, cost When at issue, and the
choice of the parents and the handicapped child himself. This test
properly respects the unique nature of each handicapped student and
the role of parents as advocates, yet preserves judicial deference to the
findings of state educational administrators and agencies.
II.
A.

HISTORY

STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF THE ACT

The central tool of the Act is the development of an "individualized educational program" (hereinafter IEP) s for each handicapped
18. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(19). Subsection 19 of the Act provides:
(19) The term "individualized education program" means a written statement
for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of
the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be

qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents
or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which
statement shall include(A) a statement of the present levels of educatonal performance of such
child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives,
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such
child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in
regular educational programs,
(D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such
services, and
(E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and schedules
for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional
objectives are being achieved.
Id; see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.346 (1990).
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child. Implicit within the IEP provision is the recognition of the integral
role of the handicapped child's parents. 9 The IEP becomes the "blueprint" from which the school will build a child's "free appropriate
public education" during the following school year.
What constitutes "appropriate" within the "free appropriate public education" dictated by the Act has been the subject of considerable
case law and legal commentary. 20 The statutory definition of
"appropriate' 2 1 provides little guidance to educators, judges and
parents. Although a clear substantive definition is impractical given the
individualized nature of the Act 2 3 educators, parents, and judges
require some guidance to determine whether they have complied with

the Act.2
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the Act also established a
general rule that "handicapped children should be educated with nonhandicapped children to the maximum extent appropriate for them.
This is a rule of least restriction: government should act only in the

way that interferes minimally with a citizen's liberties. ' 25 Least restriction "forbids a state from using a bazooka to kill a fly on a citizen's

back if a fly swatter would do as well."

26

Therefore, least restriction

has been interpreted as a constitutional principle which enables the
government to act but does not permit it to take any form of action it
27
may wish.
19. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 182 n.6 (1982).
The Supreme Court recognized that the placement of parents on the IEP team resulted
from Congress' efforts to maximize parental involvement in the IEP process. Id.;.see
also Turnbull, supra note 7, at 402 and 402 n.5.
20. Myers, supra note 3, at 405.

21. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(18). This section of the Act states:
(18) The term "free appropriate public education means special education and
related services that(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge,

Id.

(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program
required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Myers, supra note 3, at 404-05.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Turnbull, supra note 7, at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id; see also Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the
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The "least restrictive environment" requirement directly remedies
the congressional finding that "one million of the handicapped children

in the United States are excluded entirely from the public school system
and will not go through the educational process with their peers.",,
For example, the Act now requires that these children be brought into
the public school systems. 29 Additionally, by application of the least
restrictive environment provision, handicapped children have advanced

30
toward the regular classroom, away from segregated programs. Those
children who have not obtained regular classroom placement can be

HandicappedAct: A Study in the Interpretationof Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 349 (1990) [hereinafter Weber]. Professor Weber indicates that the Act is rooted
in the civil rights movement. Although prior to the Act, handicapped students were
completely and legally excluded from the public education system,
[plublic exclusion practices eventually collided with the civil rights movement.
In 1954 Brown v. Board of Education established that black children had the
right to equal educational opportunities, and that segregated schooling denied
them this right. Advocates of the disabled argued that handicapped children
were also entitled to equal access to the public schools . . .[these advocates]

took to the courts to enforce the right to educational equality.
Weber at 356 (footnote omitted).
28. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)(4) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
29. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982).
"[Tihe intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education to handicapped
children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once
inside." Id.
30. U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., To AssuRE THE FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION

OF ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: Nnm

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLE-

MENTATION OF THE EDUCATION OF ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT 3-6 (1987). In the

Ninth Annual Report to Congress on the implementation of the Act it was reported

that for the 1985-86 school year:
(1) 4,370,244 children received education and related services under the Act.
This amounted to 10.97% of all school enrollment.
(2) of that 4 million:
- 27% received services in regular classrooms
- 42% received services in resource rooms
- 24% received services in separate classrooms in regular schools
(most learning disabled and speech or language impaired children were in
regular classrooms or resource rooms, and 50% of mentaly retarded children
were in separate classes)
(3) 212,000 children over age 16 exited the system:
- 39% graduated with a diploma
- 15% graduated with a certificate of completion

- 4% reached maximum age for services (age 21)

- 21% dropped out
- 18% left for "other" or unknown reasons
(emotionally disturbed students have a drop-out rate of 2907)
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found along a "cascade" of educational placements which provides a
continuum of lesser to greater restrictive settings." At the least restrictive end of this continuum is placement in the neighborhood school,
and now, many children are receiving services under the Act in their
neighborhood or home school. However, as children move from greater
to lesser restriction along this continuum of placements and as contact
with non-handicapped children increases, student-to-special education
teacher ratios generally decrease, and the concentration of related
services staff decreases as well. In segregated or centralized placements,
for example, a program primarily for physically handicapped children,
schools may be able to economize on costs by maintaining an in-house
staff to provide related services for its students.3 2 As children move
from centralized or segregated programs into regular classrooms and
finally into their neighborhood schools, these related services will likely
be provided by an itinerant staff.33 Although the least restrictive
environment recognizes the social and public policy values of educating
handicapped children in the least discriminatory means,3 4 the concentration of services may decrease in lesser restrictive settings thereby
forcing parents to choose between mainstreaming and services. 5
31. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (1990); see also, LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, RIGHTS OF
HANDICAPPED PERSONS 32 (1984). The Cascade System of placement
alternatives is, from least to most restrictive: regular classroom, regular classroom with
specialist consultation, regular classroom with itinerant teachers, regular classroom plus
a resource room, part-time special class, full-time special class, special day school,
residential school, and hospital. Rothstein at 32, n.126. Additional variations of
restriction can be made by incorporating these programs into the handicapped child's
neighborhood school, and the classroom in which the child would attend were he not
disabled.
32. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(17) describes related services to include: "transportation,
and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech
pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy,
PHYSICALLY

recreation, .

.

. and medical and counseling services." Id.

33. An itinerant staff is employed or contracted by the school district to provide
services throughout the district. Each itinerant staff-member travels from school to
school delivering services to students on his or her caseload.
34. See Turnbull, supra note 7, at 168-69. Public policy encourages providing
handicapped children with appropriate educations and also favors conservation of
political and fiscal capital by reducing duplicative programs. Id. at 169; see also Weber,
supra note 28, at 393. By analogizing to race discrimination, forced segregation of
handicapped students fosters inequality. This segregation places handicapped children
in a position of inferiority. When schools provide services under the Act, they permit
handicapped children to "prosper in settings from which they have been unlawfully
barred." Weber, supra note 28, at 393.
35. Reed Martin, Ending Segregation of Handicapped Students, STATEWIDE SYSTEMS CHANGE: ILLINOIS MANUAL FOR PARENTS OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH WHO HAVE
MODERATE AND SEVERE HANDICAPS, § Legal, 4 (1988) [hereinafter Martin].
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B. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEWS THE ACT IN
ROWLEY

In Board of Educ. v. Rowley,3 6 the Supreme Court articulated the
standard for "appropriateness" under the Act. 37 Recognizing the issue
as one of statutory interpretation, 3 the Court concluded that a child's
program is "appropriate" within the Act when the state has complied

with the procedural requirements of the Act, and the IEP is "reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.' ' 3 The

following discussion of Rowley provides a descriptive summary of the

procedural safeguards of the Act because the Rowleys availed themselves of their right to hearings and review as provided by the Act.4 It
is these procedures which are central to the Rowley test for "appropriateness."
Amy Rowley was a deaf student initially placed in a regular

kindergarten classroom.' This placement was made to assess Amy's
needs for"supplemental services. At the end of a trial period, the school
determined that Amy should remain in kindergarten but be fitted with
a hearing aid which would amplify the voices of teachers and fellow

students. Amy completed kindergarten successfully. 42 Amy's IEP for

first grade proposed that Amy continue in a regular classroom, continue
use of the hearing aid, and receive instruction from a tutor for the
deaf for one hour each day and speech therapy for three hours each
week. Amy's parents agreed with most of the IEP, but requested that
Amy be provided with a sign-language interpreter in all of her academic

classes in lieu of some of the assistance proposed in the IEP .43

When the school refused the Rowleys' request, the Rowleys brought

their request before a hearing officer." The hearing officer found that
36. 458 U.S. 176 (1984).
37. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07 (1984).
38. Id. at 179.
39. Id. at 206-07.
40. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
41. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.
42. Id.
43. Id, at 184. A sign-language interpreter had been placed in Amy's kindergarten
class for a 2-week experimental period, and although the interpreter reported that Amy
did not need his services at that time, Amy's parents requested service of an interpreter
for Amy in first-grade. They argued that because Amy understood considerably less of

what went on in class than she would have had she not been deaf, she was therefore

performing below her academic potential. Id. at 184-85.
44. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991). The review by a hearing
officer is the first review granted to parents who reject the proposed school placement.
Id; see also infra note 53.
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the sign-language interpreter was not necessary because "Amy was
achieving educationally, academically, and emotionally." 45 On appeal,
the decision of the hearing officer was affirmed by the State Commissioner of Education.4
The Rowleys brought the case into federal district court claiming
that the school's IEP was not a "free appropriate public education"
without a sign-language interpreter.4 7 The district court found that
although Amy was performing better than the average child in her
class, she was performing below her potential. 4 This disparity between
her actual and potential performance led the court to conclude that
Amy's program was not a "free appropriate public education" under

the Act. 49 The district court's decision was affirmed by a divided
Second Circuit.5 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorarito interpret the
"free appropriate public education" requirement of the Act and to

establish the role of the state and federal courts in their review granted
by the Act. 5
The Court recognized that the specific procedural safeguards of
the Act were significantly important. 2 Adequate compliance with the
procedural aspects of the Act" assures Congress' mandate regarding
45. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert F-22).
46. Id.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 185-86.
50. Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
51. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186; see also infra notes 55, 176-78 and accompanying
text (discussing standard of review).
52. Id. at 205.
53. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991) (procedural safeguards) includes
in pertinent part:
(b)(1) The procedures required by this section shall include, but shall not be
limited to(A) an opportunity for the parents or guardian of a handicapped child
to examine all relevent records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child, and to obtain an independent
educational evaluation of the child;
(C) written prior notice to the parents or guardian of the child whenever
such agency or unit(i) proposes to initiate or change, or
(ii) refuses to initiate or change,
the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or
the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child;

1991:931

MAINS TREAMING

the substantive content of an IEP.14 Additionally, the "preponderance
of the evidence" standard of review 5 included within the procedural
directives, the Court observed, is not an invitation for reviewing courts
to "substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those
of the school authorities which they review." '5 6 The Court then concluded that the state would be in compliance with the Act when, (1)
the state had complied with the procedures set forth in the Act, and
(2) the IEP.developed as a result of following these procedures was
"reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits ." '57 The Act, therefore, did not require a state to maximize a
child's potential, but only to provide a "basic floor of opportunity"
through the IEP.18
The Court applied this test to Amy Rowley's program and reversed
the appellate and district courts.5 9 The Court held that the first prong

(E) an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter
relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the
child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such
child.
(2) Whenever a complaint has been received under paragraph (1)... the
parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process
hearing ... [not] conducted by an employee of such agency or unit involved
in the education or care of the child.
(c) [A]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a
[local] hearing may appeal to the State educational agency which shall conduct
an impartial review of such hearing.
(e)(2) Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made ...

Id.

shall have

the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented
pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without
regard to the amount in controversey.

54. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
55. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991). After reviewing the
records of the state administrative hearings, courts shall base their decisions on "the
preponderance of the evidence, [and] shall grant such relief as the court determines is
appropriate." Id.
56. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
57. Id. at 206-07.
58. Id. at 198-201; see also Lavinia R. Northrup and Lee W. Oxendine, Comment,

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act: The Benefits and Burdens of
Mainstreaming Capable Handicapped Children in a Regular Classroom, 38 MERCER
L.R. 903, 912 (1987) [hereinafter Northrup Comment].

59. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209.
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of the test had been met because neither the appellate nor the district
court found that the school had not complied with the procedures of
6 With respect
the Act.w
to the second prong, the Court held that because
Amy was "performing better than the average child in her grade and
[wa]s advancing easily from grade to grade" she had been receiving
educational benefit. 6' Amy's program therefore was a "free appropriate
public education" within the meaning of the Act.
The test of Rowley, summarized as procedural compliance and
educational benefit, is a workable test to administer when the issue
before a court is the "appropriateness" of a child's educational program. However, because Amy Rowley was already placed in the
mainstream, Rowley is not enlightening when the issue before a court
is solely mainstreaming. In solely mainstreaming cases courts have
generally applied a two-step analysis; first, to test both the school
district's and the parents' programs applying the Rowley test for
"appropriateness," then, if both programs meet Rowley, to consider
whether the mainstream program is required. Unfortunately, because
the second prong of the mainstreaming analysis has not been addressed
by the Supreme Court, the results have been inconsistent as courts
continue to struggle with the proper weight to accord the mainstreaming
preference under the Act.
III.
A.

WHAT ROWLEY

DID

NOT

Do

GRACE I AND GRACE II: THE GENERAL RULE

Springdale Sch. Dist. v. Grace62 was one of the first cases to apply
the Rowley test for "appropriateness" in a mainstreaming case. 63 Sherry
Grace, an eleven year old girl, was profoundly and prelingually deaf.
Her hearing loss of 95% rendered her completely deaf for all purposes.
Sherry was enrolled at the age of four in a special program for children
with hearing impairment. Because these children retained some hearing,
the program was taught orally. Due to Sherry's total hearing loss, she
did not progress in this program because children who are "profoundly
and prelingually deaf, . . . lack[] the concept of language and must not
only receive visual instruction, but also must be taught the most
60. Id.

61. Id. at 210.
62. 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
63. Springdale Sch. Dist. v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1982). [hereinafter Grace
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rudimentary matters concerning language." 64 When Sherry was six, her
parents enrolled her in the School for the Deaf which employed a total
communication system. A total communication system is a method of
visual communication encompassing signing, finger spelling, visual cues,
touching and mouthing. 65 Sherry thrived in this program, where her
skills progressed from the language of a two year-old to being able to
read at the second grade level. Her social and emotional skills also
improved. 6
After three years at the School for the Deaf, Sherry's parents
moved. They removed her from the School for the Deaf, and enrolled
her in their local school. The new school district prepared an IEP and
concluded that although Sherry's academic skills had significantly
improved at the School for the Deaf, because of her continued lack of
skills in reading, spelling, and math, the "appropriate" program was
still at the School for the Deaf. 67 The Graces objected to this placement
and obtained a due process hearing pursuant to the Act. 6 The Graces'
proposed placement at the regular school was sustained by the hearing
officer, by the Coordinator of the Department of Education and by
the district court on appeal. 69 The district court noted that although
the School for the Deaf could have provided Sherry with the "best"
free education, the Act required only an "appropriate" education.70
The Eighth Circuit (Grace 1) held that based on the facts of Sherry's
case, the program approved by the State Department of Education (the
Graces' program) was "appropriate" under the Act, and it satisfied
the mainstreaming requirement. 71 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
but ultimately remanded the case back to the Eighth Circuit for a
decision consistent with the Supreme Court's test for "appropriateness"
72
established in Rowley.
On remand and applying the Rowley test, the Eighth Circuit again
found no error in the holding of the district court (Grace 11).73
64. Springdale Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 302 (8th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter Grace 1]. The Eighth Circuit decision in Grace I was vacated by the
Supreme Court and remanded for decision consistent with Rowley. The Grace II
holding was the same as Grace I, however in Grace II, the court applied the Rowley
test for "appropriateness."
65. Grace I at 303 n.2.
66. Id. at 303.
67. Id.

68. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b), (c) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
69. Grace I, 656 F.2d at 303.
70. Id.

71. Grace II, 693 F.2d 41, 42 (8th Cir. 1982).
72. Id.
73. Id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

Specifically, the court found that (1) the state had complied with the
procedures of the Act in establishing Sherry's IEP, and (2) Sherry's
IEP was reasonably calculated to enable her to receive educational
benefits.7 4 Additionally, "[a]lthough the School for the Deaf may offer
the best educational opportunities for Sherry, the Supreme Court has
said that the Act does not require states to make available the best
possible option. ' 75 Finally, the court noted that Rowley reserved questions of educational methodology to the state, and therefore deferred
to the State Department of Education and its choice of IEP .76
In sum, Grace II established the general rule that when choosing
between two programs which are both "appropriate" under Rowley, 77
a child will not have to be afforded the "best" educational program if
it does not also offer the lesser restrictive environment. Although both
programs were found to have been "appropriate" under Rowley, the
court sustained the program requested by the Graces because in addition
to meeting the mainstreaming goal established by the Act, it was the
program chosen by the State Department of Education, and it was
"appropriate.''78 This analysis, however, still does not help to establish
the precise weight of the mainstreaming requirement under the Act.
Even though the court chose the mainstream program, the result would
have been the same had the court merely deferred to the state administrative findings. It is unclear, therefore, whether deference to the state
proceedings, or the preference for mainstreaming, or a combination of
both tipped the scale in favor of the mainstream program. In any case,
the court did not indicate that the Graces' choice, because it was the
program advanced by the parents, played any role in its analysis.
B.

APPLYING ROWLEY TO A COMPLETELY RESTRICTIVE PROGRAM

The Sixth Circuit contemplated the proper weight to be given the
mainstreaming preference in Roncker v. Walter.79 Neill Roncker was a
severely mentally retarded nine year-old boy who suffered from a
seizure disorder and required constant supervision because he was
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
See Michael S. Treppa, The EHA: Trends and Problems with "Related
Services" Provisions, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 427, 433 (1988). The Rowley rule
for "appropriateness" has been construed by commentators to mean a program
conferring some educational benefit, even "minimal educational benefit." Id.
78. See Dubow, supra note 1, at 225. "An interesting epilogue to this case is that
Sherry Grace in her teenage years returned to the Arkansas School for the Deaf." Id.
79. 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
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unable to recognize dangerous situations8 0 The IEP established by the
school district called for Neill's placement in a county school exclusively
for handicapped children.81 The Ronckers rejected that placement
because Neil would have had no contact with non-handicapped children. 82 The Ronckers sought a due process hearing wherein the hearing
officer found that the school had not satisfied its burden of proving
that its IEP afforded maximum appropriate contact with non-handicapped children.83 The hearing officer ordered that "Neill be placed
within the appropriate special education class in the regular elementary
school setting.''1 4 The decision by the hearing officer is noteworthy
because his order was for a placement neither offered by the school
district nor specifically requested by the Ronckers (although the hearing
officer's proposal would have affected the Roncker's goal of increased
mainstreaming).
On appeal by the school district, the State Board of Education
found that although the county school afforded Neill an "appropriate"
education, he needed some contact with non-handicapped children to
meet the least restrictive environment requirement. 5 The State Board
of Education held that Neill was properly placed in the county school
with the condition that some provision be made for him to interact
with non-handicapped children.86 Therefore, the State Board of Education approved the school district's program, but ordered some mainstreaming contacts.87 The administration of this conceptual program
was, however, left to the school district. 88
On appeal by the Ronckers to the district court, the Ronckers
argued that Neill could only receive an "appropriate" education in a
setting where he could interact with non-handicapped children.
Conversely, the school district argued that any minimal benefit to Neill
from mainstreaming was outweighed by the educational benefits of the
county's segregated school.89 The district court found in favor of the
80. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1060-61 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
864 (1983).
81. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.

82. Id. at 1061.
83. Id.

84. Id.at 1061.
85. Id.
86. Id.(emphasis added).

87. Id.

88. Id.
89. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1061 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 874 (1983).
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school district by deferring to the local school district's discretion in
establishing placements for handicapped children °
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit said that the district court failed to
give due weight to the state administrative proceedings under Rowley. 9'
Because both the hearing officer and the State Board of Education
found the school district's placement not "appropriate" (because of
inadequate mainstreaming), the appellate court found that the district
court erred in applying a deferential standard of review to the school
district's placement.92 By deferring to the school district, the district
court "render[ed] the administrative hearings provided for by the Act
virtually meaningless. "91
In evaluating the proper level of mainstreaming in Neill's case, the
Sixth Circuit recognized that although "[tihe Act does not require
mainstreaming in every case ... its requirement that mainstreaming be
provided to the maximum extent appropriate indicates a very strong
congressional preference." 9 The strength of that preference is reflected
in the court's test for mainstreaming:
[PIlacement which may be considered better for academic reasons may not be appropriate because of the failure to provide
for mainstreaming. The perception that a segregated institution
is academically superior for a handicapped child may reflect no
more than a basic disagreement with the mainstreaming concept.
. . . In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which
make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a
non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be inappropriate under the Act. Framing
the issue in this manner accords the proper respect for the
strong preference in favor of mainstreaming while still realizing
the possibility that some handicapped children simply must be
educated in segregated facilities .... Cost is a proper factor to
consider since excessive spending on one handicapped child
deprives other handicapped children .... Cost is no defense,
however, if the school district has failed to use its funds to
provide a proper continuum of alternative placements for handicapped children.95
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1062.
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id. at 1063 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. (citation omitted).
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The appellate court said that the district court must determine whether
Neill's needs required some service which could not feasibly be provided
in a segregated class in a regular school. 96 Although the Sixth Circuit
recognized that this placed a difficult burden on the district court, the
district court may rely on the state administrative findings for guidance.91 Also, this result is reasonable under the Act because the court
framed the issue as one of "mainstreaming" and not one of "meth-

odology. "98

The major flaw of the school district's proposed IEP in Roncker
was the failure to establish any type of continuum of placements for
Neill. 99 Recognizing that Neill was not a candidate for full mainstreaming, the school proposed a completely segregated school as the only
alternative to a completely mainstreamed placement.' °° Both the hearing
officer and the State Board of Education agreed that Neill's segregated
placement did not meet the mainstreaming goal of the Act. The hearing
officer sought to solve the problem by substituting his judgement for
that of the school district. Conversely, the State Board accepted the
school district's program but ordered Neill's interaction with nonhandicapped children within that program.
The Roncker decision may most aptly be construed as an appeal
tQ schools to be creative in moving handicapped children from com96. Id; see, e.g., A.W. v. Northwest R-I Sch. Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163-64 (8th
Cir. 1987) (held that under Roncker, the district court was correct in considering cost
to the school district as a factor of feasibility).
97. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
98. For a discussion regarding problems which arise when courts confuse mainstreaming with methodology, see infra notes 142-73 and accompanying text.
99. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551 (1990); see also Martin, supra note 35. Reed Martin,
leading writer and advocate for children in special education and plaintiff's attorney in
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989), has observed:
[S]ome schools all across the country [automatically place children in a
predetermined type of school soley on the basis of their classificaiton i.e.,
trainable mentally retarded], making what can only be characterized as
automatic categorical placements. Responding to school adminstrative needs
rather than individual differences, they group children together and then let
the demands of that placement dictate an all or nothing decision about
integration. For example, a certain classification might produce a self-contained class whose students traditionally do not leave for any purpose. The
school does not individually examine each child, contrasting his unique needs
with each element of the school program, thus making an individual decision
which might be different for one child's art class, another child's recess and
still another child's transportation.
Martin, supra note 35, at 1-2.
100. Both parties agreed that Neill could not receive mainstreamed substantive
education classes. See Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1061.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 12

pletely segregated placements into lesser restrictive placements. The
Roncker rule of completely transposing the program from the greater
restrictive environment to the lesser restrictive environment, where
feasible, has been more readily applied where the challenged placement
was completely restrictive, causing the handicapped child to be completely segregated from non-handicapped children.' 0' It is clear from
this rule that so long as the lesser restrictive program is "appropriate,"
mainstreaming is a clear preference unless prohibitive cost renders the
mainstream program not feasible. Practically however, prohibitive cost
is an argument available only to the school district, and may be an
argument which will trump all others. For example, in a situation
where parents have argued for a mainstream placement which the
school rejects as cost prohibitive, the school will prevail because under
Roncker, prohibitive cost is a permissible factor in feasibility. In the
alternate situation, where parents argue for greater restriction, the
district may argue only the Act's preference for mainstreaming and
prevail here as well. Because of this unilateral use of the prohibitive
cost factor, the weight of "mainstreaming" is different when in the
hands of the school district than when in the hands of the parents.
C. CONFUSION INCORPORATING "MAINSTREAMING"
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION"

INTO A "FREE

Other courts have struggled with establishing the precise role and
weight to give the mainstreaming requirement when mainstreaming was
101. See Weber supra note 28, at 391.
(Tihe implications of Roncker run far to the contrary of Rowley. Rowley
expounded the idea of a minimal duty to provide access to some educational
benefit; Roncker established an open-ended commitment to provide services
in settings where they ha[d] never before been provided. Although the facts
of Roncker primarily involved moving the child into a regular school building,
the commitment to provide services to enable a child to be in the mainstream
could entail much more - as much outside help as the child needs to survive
in a regular classroom for part or all of the day.
Id.; see, e.g., Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990)
(rejected the "better" academic residential placement proposed by the parents in favor
of an "appropriate" academic placement in a learning disabilities class in a public
school); Department of Educ., Haw. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1983)
(school's proposed homebound program found "inappropriate" under the Act for
failure to provide for any interaction with non-handicapped children); Barwacz v.
Michigan Dept. of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (parent's request for a
segregated school for the deaf rejected in favor of public school placement); Community
High Sch. Dist. 155 v. Denz, 463 N.E.2d 998 (I11.App. Ct. 1984) (school's proposed
homebound program found to meet the "appropriate" standard of Rowley, but rejected
because it provided for no contact with non-handicapped children).
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the only issue. Unlike Grace H and Roncker, where both programs
were found to have been "appropriate" under Rowley, the Idaho
Supreme Court refused to find a program "appropriate" without a
mainstreaming provision. In Thornock v. Boise Sch. Dist. 1,102 the
supreme court applied a test for mainstreaming which required balancing the preference of mainstreaming with "the primary objective of
providing handicapped children with an 'appropriate education." ' ' 03
The supreme court made the mainstreaming mandate a factor in
establishing a child's "appropriate" placement.1' 4
Gabriel Thornock was a multiply handicapped child, classified as
"trainable mentally retarded."' 15 The school district's proposed placement for Gabriel was a self-contained special education classroom in a
regular school. The Thornocks rejected that placement, requesting that
Gabriel be placed in a mainstream classroom with a full-time aide, and
sought review at a due process hearing. The school district had "made
no offer to consider any placement other than in a segregated classroom
for 'special education' children."' 6 The hearing officer approved the
school district's placement and the State Board of Education affirmed
that decision.I°7 The Thornocks then appealed to the state district court,
which rejected the school district's placement in a segregated classroom
18
and chose the mainstreamed program proposed by the Thornocks. 0
The school district appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court and
argued that the district court had not given due weight to the decisions
of the hearing officer and the State Board of Education.'09 The supreme
court, however, upheld the district court's findings of fact, and found
Gabriel's IEP not "appropriate" because the school district had failed
to rebut the substantial evidence that mainstreaming was appropriate
for Gabriel." 0 Because the IEP prepared by the school district failed
102. 767 P.2d 1241 (Idaho 1988); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2)(c) (Any party
appealing a discision made by the State educational agency may appeal to either "any
State court of competent jurisdiction or ...

[to] a district court of the United States

without regard to the amount in controversy.").
103. Thornock v. Boise Sch. Dist. 1, 767 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Idaho 1988) (emphasis
added) (quoting Wilson V. Marana Unified Sch. Dist. of Prima County, 735 F.2d
1178, 1183 (9th Cir. 1981). The Thornock case also involved the issue of a school
district's obligation to pay for supplementary services in a private school under the
Act, an issue beyond the scope of this Comment.
104. Thornock, 767 P.2d at 1249.
105. Id. at 1243.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1244.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.at 1245.
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to state the extent to which Gabriel would be able to participate in
regular educational programs, a procedural requirement of the Act, the
program was per se not an "appropriate" program."' The court
explained that it did not mean to denigrate the expertise of the school
authorities, but that because the school system offered no evidence that
its system was more efficient, the district was obligated to treat
"mainstreaming, to the maximum extent appropriate, as its preference."" 2

In a strongly-worded dissent, Chief Justice Shepard rejected the
majority's conclusion that the mainstreaming of handicapped children
was required." 3' "[The Act] does not necessarily require 'mainstreaming'
in cases where a child would receive no educational benefits therefrom."" 4 Justice Shepard concluded that Gabriel's interaction with
non-handicapped children in the school district's IEP, during lunch,

recess, and P.E., was "mainstreamed to the maximum extent appro-

priate" for Gabriel." 5 Finally, Justice Shepard warned that Gabriel's
mainstreamed placement was "essentially a warehousing process," a
severe conclusory placement not required by the Act." 6
Like Roncker, the flaw in the school district's IEP may have been
in its failure to provide a continuum of services for Gabriel." 7 Its only
offer to the Thornocks was complete academic segregation or nothing.
Although it is understandable that the school district sought to keep
its special education costs low, its failure to creatively assure Gabriel's
contact with non-handicapped children doomed its program. When a
school district proposes a completely segregated program, it must justify
that segregation by explaining why a child cannot have contact with

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1247.

Thornock v. Boise Sch. Dist. 1, 767 P.2d 1241, 1251 (Idaho 1988).
Id. at 1258 (Shepard, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

116. Id. at 1260.
117. MADEILINE WILL,

OFFICE OF SPEcIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERV.,

EDUCATING STUDENTS WITH LEARNING PROBLEMS: A

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY (1986)

[hereinafter Will]. Ms. Will, Assistant Secretary for the Office of Special Education
and Rehabilitation Services (OSERS), calls this the "fragmented approach," where
school districts try to fit handicapped children into predetermined "delivery systems."
Id. at 5. OSERS has challenged the states to renew their commitment to serve
handicapped children effectively. At the heart of this commitment is a "search for
[creative] ways to serve as many of these children as possible in the regular education
classroom." Id. at 19; see also Turnbull, supra note 7, at 163 (The least restrictive
environment has not pushed handicapped children into the "mainstream," and will
not, until courts use it more creatively.).
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non-handicapped peers. There is a presumptive preference for mainstream contacts for handicapped students, but a school district can
sufficiently rebut this presumption by arguing either that the mainstream program would confer no educational benefit, or that mainstream contacts for this child would be cost prohibitive.
The absence of educational benefit argument is a weak argument
because, if the school district has a true continuum of programs in
place, one step toward lesser restriction should not negate all educational benefit. However, if the school district provides this segregated
program in a building exclusively for handicapped children, it may not
be
able to offer any mainstream contacts without incurring potentially
prohibitive
cost, as one step toward lesser restriction might require
a
move to another school building. Because prohibitive cost is a permissible argument for the school district, the school district can indefinitely
avoid creating a continuum of placements, following the letter of the
law under Rowley, yet miss the spirit of the law - to afford handicapped students educational opportunity equal to that of their nonhandicapped peers." 8
However, other courts have been reluctant to require "mainstreaming" as a necessary factor in "appropriateness." In DeBlaay v. Fairfax
County Sch. Bd." 9 the Fourth Circuit adopted the view taken by Chief
Justice Shepard in the Thornock dissent. 2° Michael DeVries was a
seventeen year-old autistic student. The IEP prepared by the school
district chose a vocational center serving exclusively handicapped children for Michael's placement. Michael's mother contested that placement, arguing that, notwithstanding the school district's procedural
compliance with the Act pursuant to Rowley, Michael's IEP was not
a "free appropriate public education" because the school district had
not sustained its burden of proving that Michael could not receive an
"appropriate" education at the local high school. 2 '
The school district's IEP was upheld by both the hearing officer
and the state reviewing officer. 22 On appeal, the district court relied
on language in Roncker which recognized that although preferable,
mainstreaming is not appropriate for every handicapped child. 2a In its
findings of fact, the district court noted that although Michael had
118. Weber, supra note 28, at 353-54.
119. 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1989).
120. DeBlaay v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989). See
supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Shepard's dissent).
121. DeBlaay, 882 F.2d at 878.
122. Id. at 877.
123. Id.; Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (1983).
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been successful in a community setting where he held a job, his cognitive
and academic functioning was depressed and he had difficulty with his
social skills in the school environment.' 24 The court concluded that
"there is no appropriate peer group academically, socially or vocationally ,for Michael at [the local high school]. Even with an aide ...
Michael would simply be monitoring classes."' The court held that
the TEP proposed by the school district was a "free appropriate public
education" in the "least restrictive environment" because Michael's
26
education in the high school could not be accomodated.'
The striking difference between the reasoning used in Thornock
and DeBlaay is the role of the mainstreaming requirement in determining whether or not an IEP is a "free appropriate public education" in
the "least restrictive environment." The Thornock court concluded
that a school district must bear the burden of proving that the least
restrictive environment cannot be appropriate. Absent such proof, a
child must be mainstreamed; the mainstream program is therefore
presumptively "appropriate." The DeBlaay court said that if it is
shown that the mainstreamed program is not "appropriate," the more
restrictive program becomes the "appropriate" program in the "least
restrictive environment."'2 7 The request of the parents was not dispositive in either case, as both parents argued for the least restrictive
environment program. Although the Thornock program was "appropriate" under Rowley, the DeBlaay decision may effectively assure a
child more than minimal benefit by permitting a program to be
"appropriate" absent a mainstreaming provision.
Parents have argued in the Second, Third and Fifth Circuits that
an IEP which does not mainstream cannot be a free appropriate public
education." 8 The Second Circuit rejected the parents' request for a
mainstreamed program by upholding the hearing officer's finding that
the parents had not sustained their burden of proving that the handicapped child's needs could only be met in a mainstreamed environ-

124. DeBlaay, 882 F.2d at 879.

125. Id.

126. Id.at 880.

127. Id. The Fourth Circuit said that the district court "fully considered the Act's
mainstreaming requirements" by observing that "Michael could not be satisfactorily
educated in regular classes even with the use of supplementary aids and services." Id.

at 878.
128. See, e.g., Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. of State of Conn., 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.
1989); Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989); Liscio V.
Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., 734 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd without comment,
902 F.2d 1561 (3d Cir. 1990).

MAINSTREAMING

1991:93]

ment. 2 9 Therefore, the school district's placement in a more restrictive
setting became a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive
30
environment because the mainstreamed program was not appropriate.'
In Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ. , 3 1 the Fifth Circuit upheld
the school district's proposed IEP which removed Daniel from a regular
kindergarten.3 2 The school district claimed that the mainstream program was not "appropriate" because Daniel, who suffered from mental
retardation and a speech impairment as a victim of Down's Syndrome,
was receiving little educational benefit and was disrupting the class.' 33
Daniel's parents argued that by removing Daniel from the mainstream
classroom, the school district had not provided Daniel with a continuum
of special education services.'1 The district court rejected the parents'
contention and upheld the finding of the hearing officer that Daniel
was receiving no educational benefit in the mainstream program.
Therefore the school district's program was a free appropriate public
35
education in the least restrictive environment. ,
The Daniel court rejected the Roncker test (which requires that
the "better" more restrictive program be transposed into a lesser
restrictive environment, where feasible)' 36 and established a two-part
test for mainstreaming; (1) can education in the regular classroom be
achieved satisfactorily with use of supplemental aids and services, and
if not, then (2) has the school mainstreamed the child to the maximum
extent appropriate? 37 The court felt that this inquiry would give proper
deference to the choice of methodologies selected by the local school
officials (i.e. local district, hearing officials, and state board of education). The requirements of the first prong of the test can be established by evidence that the state has taken steps to accomodate the
handicapped child into regular education, this child will receive educational benefit from regular education, and this child's presence in the
regular classroom will not be disruptive. 38 Requirements of the second
prong can be established by evidence that the state has provided a
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Briggs, 882 F.2d at 691.
Id.
874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1039.

134. Id. at 1043.

135. Id. at 1047.
136. See supra notes 79-101 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of
Roncker.
137. Daniel, 874 F.2d at 1048.
138. Id.
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continuum of services.' 39 Applying this test to Daniel's placement, the
court approved the school district's placement and said that the mainstream program "offer[ed] Daniel nothing but an opportunity to
associate with non-handicapped students."' 40 This warning from the
court sounds like the "warehouse" warning from Justice Shepard's
4
dissent in Thornock.1 1
Unlike the Idaho Supreme Court in Thornock, these courts are
reluctant to manufacture some minimal educational benefit in a mainstreamed setting in which there is no educational benefit. Although the
"minimal benefit" requirement in Rowley could have easily been used
to justify the decision to mainstream in these cases, the courts were
looking for greater educational benefit, or at least positive evidence of
some educational benefit. These courts clearly will accept a segregated
program as "appropriate" in the least restrictive environment by a
showing that a child will not receive educational benefit in the mainstream program. Unlike the program in Thornock, an IEP can be a
free appropriate public education absent a mainstreaming provision.
This reasoning properly preserves some educational benefit for the
handicapped student. It is worrisome that the parents or the school
district may rely on the congressional preference for mainstreaming,
and absent a contravening argument such as prohibitive cost or no
educational benefit, a child may be "mainstreamed," but receive
inadequate "individual" services. In creating the "least restrictive
environment" provision of the Act, it is unlikely that Congress intended
that handicapped students be present in mainstream classrooms, but
unable to participate in any meaningful way.
D. DOES THE "LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT" REQUIRE THE
HOME SCHOOL? IS IT "MAINSTREAMING" OR "METHODOLOGY"?

Most of the cases discussed above involve fact patterns where
parents have objected to a more restrictive placement proposed by the
school district. Often, the school district's placement involves a centralized program directed to the needs of children within a specific
disability group, for example, physically handicapped, hearing im-

paired, or vision impaired children. These centralized programs may
be housed within a regular education school building, which permits
the handicapped children to be mainstreamed into regular classrooms
139. Id. at 1050.
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Thornock dissent.
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at any time during the day. Conflicts may arise, however, when parents
whose children are mainstreamed within these programs seek to have
the program duplicated at the child's neighborhood or home school.
These parents are relying on regulatory language which states that,
"[ulnless a handicapped child's individualized education program requires some other arrangement, the child is educated in the school
which he or she would attend if not handicapped.' 1 42 Conversely,
parents may object when the school district proposes removing the
child from a centralized special education program into the home
school. 43 Recent decisions indicate however, that within the prescriptions of the Act, the school district may be the only party able to
demand the home school.
In Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd.,144 Michael Barnett had
flourished in a cued speech program for the hearing impaired. 45 Michael
received services from this program which was located in a regular
education school building, although not his home school. By Michael's
sophomore year in high school, he was completely mainstreamed for
all of his academic classes. 1' Michael's parents argued that categorical
placement in a centralized program, albeit a mainstream program,
ignored Michael's individual needs in violation of the Act, and therefore
sought to have the cued speech program duplicated at Michael's local
high school. At a due process hearing, the hearing officer agreed that
the cued speech program should be provided at Michael's local high
school. '41 The state administrative hearing officer reversed the due
process hearing officer, and the Barnetts appealed to the district
court. '4

The district court upheld the decision of the state hearing officer,
and found that the centralized program proffered by the school district
142. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552 (c) (1990).
143. See, e.g., No Dogs Allowed, TIME, Sept 17, 1990, at 55. Sixth-grader Michael
Gaudiello and his parents objected to Michael's transfer from his mainstream program

at a school with a physically handicapped program, to Michael's home school. Michael's
father Ralph Gaudiello indicated that Michael would be the only disabled student at
the new school. Neither Michael nor Michael's parents agreed with this placement -

Michael just wanted to stay at his old school with his long-time friends. Telephone
Interview with Ralph and Michael Gaudiello (Oct. 10, 1990). See also supra notes 20107 for a discussion regarding the Regular Education Initiative, or full inclusion
programs.
144. 927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991).
145. Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 149 (4th Cir. 1991).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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was "appropriate.' ' 49 The court reasoned that it was within a school
district's discretion to centralize resources in a program serving a small
number of students in order to gain "educational advantages of
centraliz[ation]."'1'1 Michael's parents then appealed to the Fourth
Circuit where they argued that the Act required the school district to
duplicate the cued speech program at Michael's home school.,"
Applying Rowley, the Fourth Circuit found that the school district
had properly complied with the procedural requirements of the Act.'52
The court also found that the centralized program was "appropriate"
under Rowley because Michael had received "tremendous educational
benefit from the cued speech program" there. 3 The final issue for
consideration then became whether the Act required the school district
to duplicate this "appropriate" cued speech program at Michael's
home school as his parents had requested. The appellate court explained
that the Act and the regulations did not create a duty to place a child
in his home school, but rather that the school board consider the
proximity of the proposed program to the child's home as one factor
in choosing a program.1 4 Additionally, the court recognized that the
school could legitimately consider the cost of providing the cued speech
program to Michael at his home school.' 5 5 "Congress intended the
states to balance the competing interests of economic necessity, on the
one hand, and the special needs of a handicapped child, on the other,
when making education placement decisions."' 5 6 Therefore, notwithstanding the preference for mainstreaming at the local school, the
school district's program was a free appropriate public education in
the least restrictive environment. '57
It is interesting to note that in this case, the court interpreted the
centralized special education program as a school district's choice in
educational methodology, to which the court may defer. Conversely,
the court could have concluded that the failure of the district to
duplicate the program at the neighborhood school was a failure to
149. Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 721 F. Supp. 757, 761 (E.D. Va. 1989).

150. Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 149 (citing Barnett V.
Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 721 F. Supp. 757, 761-62 (E.D. Va. 1989)).
151. Id.at 150.
152. Id.at 151.
153. Id.at 153 (quoting Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 721 F. Supp. 757
(E.D. Va. 1989).
154. Id.at 153 (relying on 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.522 (a)(3),(c) and official comments
thereto).
155. Id.at 154.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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provide a continuum of educational placements, a violation of the Act.
Although the court acknowledged that the school district was operating
with limited financial resources, when the court accepted a centralized
program as a permissible choice in methodology, the court opened the
door to arguments for segregated programs regardless of the limited
financial resources/prohibitive cost argument.
In Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist.,"' the Eighth Circuit
came to a similar conclusion after applying a somewhat strained
argument to a distinguishable fact pattern. Erika Schuldt was born
with spina bifida and was paralyzed below the waist. 5 9 As a result, she
used a wheelchair and required physical therapy, catheterization, and
bowel care. When Erika was ready for kindergarten, the Schuldts
notified the school district that they wanted Erika to attend the local
grade school. The school district advised the Schuldts that the local
school was not accessible to Erika in her wheelchair, and that the
school district was not required to make the school accessible for her.
The school district offered the Schuldts their choice of three other
grade schools which were wheelchair accessible. 16 The Schuldts sought
relief at a due process hearing in order to compel the school district to
61
make the local school building accessible for Erika.1
The hearing officer found that the school district had not complied
with the procedural requirements of the Act, that Erika's IEP was not
a "free appropriate public education," and that "placement at a school
other than [the local school] did not constitute placement in the least
restrictive environment as required under the . . .Act."' 612 The school
district appealed to the State Commissioner of Education who determined that although the school district had not complied with procedural requirements of the Act, placement at the accessible school was
a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. 63
On appeal by the Schuldts, the district court focused only on the
resultant program offered by the school district.'6 The district court
said that although the school district had failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of the Act, the program in the accessible
school was a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

937 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1991).
Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist., 937 F.2d 1357, 1359 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1359 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1359-60.
Id. at 1359.
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environment. The court found that even if the school district had
complied with the procedural requirements of the Act, it would still
have chosen only the accessible school. 65 According to the district
court, because the accessible program complied with the "ultimate
objective" of the Act, the program had actually satisfied the requirements of the Act.' 66
On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the Schuldts argued that the
school district's noncompliance with the procedures of the Act (as
required under Rowley) was a per se denial of a "free appropriate
public education" for Erika. 67 The court stated however, that the
Schuldts' argument which required that the school district place Erika
in her home school "misinterpret[ed] the act, misuse[d] precedent, and
essentially ignore[d] the district court's determination that the school
district [had] fully complied with the Act by placing Erika [at the
accessible school]."' 6 The court reasoned that placement at the home
school was not a requiremnt of the Act, but proximity to the home
school was only one factor which a school district must consider. 69 A
school district must choose the home school "unless the child's program
requires something else."' 70 In addition to gaining access to the school
building itself, Erika's IEP also called for movement within crowded
classrooms, access to the library, storage for Erika's wheelchair, and a
private room where Erika could receive physical therapy and catheterization.' 7 1 The court concluded by finding the program at the accessible
school "appropriate" because it provided Erika with a "fully integrated
public education" even though it denied her contact with her siblings
and with neighborhood children.'
Barnett can be easily distinguished from Schuldt. The Barnett
court recognized the presence of a centralized program at the cued
speech school. This program served a core group of hearing impaired
students, all with similar educational and theraputic needs, a program
which can be characterized as a program of educational methodology.
165. Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist., 937 F.2d at 1360 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing
Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4-89-636, Slip op. at 14).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1361.
169. Id.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 1361, n.6. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has described
"clean intermittent catheterization" as a simple procedure which "may be performed
in a few minutes by a layperson with less than an hour's training." Irving Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 885 (1984) (emphasis added).
172. Schuldt, 937 F.2d at 1361.
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In Schuldt, however, the school district was able to rely on physical

access alone as a centralized program offered only at the accessible

school. Yet the Schuldts had been offered their choice of one of three

accessible school buildings suggesting that the school district did not
have an established program of accessibility in any specific building
prior to Erika's enrollment. It is difficult to imagine that a court could
recognize the presence of physical access alone as a permissible choice

in methodology.
In both cases, however, had the school district proposed the home
school because it was cheapest, and had the parents objected to that
placement, the courts would likely have sustained the choice of the

home school as both "appropriate" under Rowley and as fulfilling the
mainstreaming requirement.' 73 Michael Barnett's parents could not have

relied on an argument in which they preferred a centralized program
because choice of educational methodology is for the educators. Once
again, mainstreaming in the home school can either be incorporated or
ignored, incorporated when offered by the school district or the state
74
educational agencies, or ignored when requested by the parents alone.,
E.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE PARENTS?

Congress recognized the role of a handicapped child's parents as

advocate, and consequently gave parents or guardians a procedure to

"present complaints" regarding a child's IEP or placement.'

Yet the

procedures of the Act work in such a way that the parents will always
be the initial complaining party because the school district develops an
IEP with which the parents must either agree or disagree. Due to this

procedural imbalance, parents have no real influence in the creation of
their child's IEP. Practically speaking, unless the parents' proposition

is upheld either by the hearing officer at the due process hearing, or
173. See e.g., Kerkam v. Superintendent, 931 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (sustained

day placement at a local public school over the parents' choice of a private day school
and a group residential home); Hulme v. Dellmuth, No. 89-6189, 1991 WL 83115,
(E.D. Pa. 1991) (sustained a lesser restrictive program offered by the school because it
met the mainstream requirement of the Act).
174. The only time parents may rely on the mainstream requirement of the Act in
placing their child is when the parents' program is upheld at the due process hearing
or by the state administrative agency. Because a reviewing court must give due weight
to administrative findings, the parents' program must be sustained somewhere in the
administrative process, otherwise the reviewing court will have no basis to find for the
parents. See Gallegos, supra note 14 at 265. "In applying the Rowley standard, parents
are left without a judicial tool for securing their preferred approach." Id.
175. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415.
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by the state educational agency, the parents will be foreclosed on appeal
in a civil action. 7 6
In addition to the "appropriateness" rule in Rowley, the Supreme
Court also established the appropriate standard of review under the
Act.' 77 Notwithstanding "extensive parental involvement" in establishing a child's IEP ,78 a reviewing court may not overturn "a State's
choice of appropriate educational theories . . . . [Q]uestions of methodology are for resolution by the States."' 79 Therefore, the parents'
program must be supported either by the hearing officer or by the state
reviewing board to withstand the deference a court must give to the
state review process.
The harshness of this approach was recently evident in the Second
Circuit. In Briggs v. Bd. of Educ.,'° the court virtually stripped parents
of any ability they may have had to challenge the school's placement
by sustaining the hearing officer's demand that the parents prove how
the least restrictive environment program they requested could be
feasible.'' James Briggs was a three year-old suffering from moderate
to severe sensorineural hearing loss, and mild to moderate speech and
language delays. The school district proposed that James be placed in
a pre-school program for hearing-impaired children. The Briggs argued
that the school district's program was not appropriate because of
inadequate interaction with non-handicapped children. 8 2 At the due
process hearing, the hearing officer found that the school district's
proposed program was "appropriate," and that the Briggs "ha[d]
failed to support their contention that James' needs c[ould] be met
only in a social milieu of predominantly non-handicapped children."' 8
On appeal to the district court, the Briggs argued that the hearing
officer erred by placing the burden on them to prove that James could
only receive an "appropriate" education in the least restrictive environment. The district court reversed the hearing officer, and found that
the school district's program was "not appropriate" within the meaning
of the Act because the program could have "feasibly" been offered in
a lesser restrictive setting. 's4
176. See Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
177. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (e)(2).

178. Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 209, n.31
(1982).
179. Id. at 208.

180. 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
181. Briggs v. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989).
182. Id. at 689.

183. Id.at 691.

184. Id. at 692-93 (although the district court did not explain how this could
"feasibly" be done).
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In limiting its review only to the test of Rowley, the Second Circuit
reversed the district court.'85 Because the Briggs had failed to establish
any evidence on the record that the program proposed by the school
district could have been provided in a lesser restrictive setting, it was
not the court's role to do so. "We do not know if the same services
c[ould have] be[en] provided in a less segregated setting . . . [hlowever,
it [wa]s not our role to decide that question, nor was it the role of the
district court."' t In this situation, mainstreaming in the hands of the
parents did not even operate as a mere preference! The hearing officer
and the circuit court both demanded that the parents, as complaining
parties, prove the school district's program "not appropriate."
The Eighth Circuit has suggested an interesting solution to this
problem: "the school district should have the opportunity, and to an
extent ha[ve] the duty, to try these less restrictive alternatives before
recommending [greater restriction]." ' 87 This requirement may permit
parents to rely on a presumption which says that an "appropriate"
program, moved to the least restrictive environment is still "appropriate" under Rowley. The school district would then have to rebut this
choice with evidence that the parents' program is "not appropriate,"
or that the cost factor far outweighs the preference for mainstreaming.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Even in light of considerable case law on the subject of mainstreaming, there is evidence that courts, educators and parents are still
struggling with the proper application of the mainstream mandate
within a child's individual program."'8 Recently, the First Circuit established yet another test for determining whether a child had been
adequately mainstreamed.' 8 9 The test is brilliant rhetoric, but this author
185. Id. at 693 (whether the state complied with the procedures established by the
Act, and whether the IEP is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
educational benefits").

186. Id. at 693.

187. Evans v. Dist. No. 17 of Douglas Cty. Neb., 841 F.2d 824, 832 (8th Cir.
1988). It must be stressed that this case presented a situation where parents made a

unilateral placement in a residential setting, with the school district arguing for lesser
restriction. Id.

188. Dubow, supra note 1, at 215 (acknowledged that the concept of the least

restrictive environment has "provoked more controversey and confusion than any other

issue in special education").
189. Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 993 (Ist Cir. 1990).
To determine a particular child's place on [the] continuum, the desirability of

mainstreaming must be weighed in concert with the Act's mandate for
educational improvement. Assaying an appropriate educational plan, there-
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challenges any court, educator or parent to apply it to a child's
individualized program and reach an acceptable or understandable
placement based on this test alone. Additionally, in spite of the
seemingly important role given to parents under the Act as the advocates
for their children, in practice this role may be little more than perfunctory. To date there has been no reported case in which the parents'
choice, as a factor in and of itself, was found to have played a
significant role.
Once a child's placement has been narrowed to a choice between
two "appropriate" programs under Rowley, in rendering their decisions, courts must look to other permissible factors including the
findings of the state administrative agencies, the preference for mainstreaming, and cost to the school district. In some instances however,
there may be evidence that notwithstanding these articulated factors,
the court has considered the "best" program .19
The Supreme Court should grant certiorarion a case in which the
sole issue is mainstreaming for several reasons. First, as school districts
develop more programs along the continuum of special education, there
is an increased chance that more than one program will be found to
be "appropriate" under the Rowley test. The rule of Rowley will not
be helpful in such a case and courts and educators need to know
whether mainstreaming operates as a preference, as a presumption or
as a mandate, and whether it ever outweighs findings of the state
administrative agencies. Secondly, the Court should articulate a role
for parents which is something beyond that of mere plaintiff, especially
when the handicapped child himself aligns with his parents and opposes
the school district's placement. Finally, the inequities that may arise
when the school district is permitted to rely on the mainstreaming
requirement in developing placements should be eliminated, because
the mainstreaming factor assumes a different weight when exercised by
the parents than when exercised by the school district.
fore, requires a balancing of the marginal benefits to be gained or lost on
both sides of the maximum benefit/least restrictive fulcrum. Neither side is
automatically entitled to extra ballast.
Id. (citation omitted).
190. See Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982). The "best" program might be described
as one which seeks to "maximize the [educational] potential of each handicapped child
commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped children." Id; see also,
Gallegos, supra note 14 at 259. Courts often ignore the strict minimum standards of
Rowley in order to obtain expansive services for handicapped children, especially when
parents have argued for a more restrictive placement for their child because of the
severity of the handicap. Id.
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Most of the prior case law discussions involved choices between
two "appropriate" programs under Rowley. As school districts create
more options along the special education continuum, the "minimal
benefit" threshhold will likely be crossed in more than one program
offered by the school district. For example, a completely restrictive
home tutoring program would certainly confer educational benefit to
nearly any child. In the alternative, it could be argued that even a
profoundly retarded child could gain socialization skills in a regular
education classroom. Consequently, in accepting minimal benefit as the
only factor, nearly any program would meet Rowley.
Beyond Rowley, courts must look to additional factors in choosing
between two "appropriate" programs. In approving the program requested by the parents, the Eighth Circuit in Grace II merely sustained
the program upheld by both levels of state administrative hearings
although the program had the added benefit of being in the lesser
restrictive environment. 191 Likewise, the Roncker court approved a lesser
restrictive program approved by both levels of state administrative
hearings. 92 The mainstreaming requirement may not have been dispositive in either case though, because both courts would have held the
same had they merely deferred to the findings of the state administrative
agencies. The fact that it was the parents who had requested these
lesser restrictive placements was not an articulated factor in the court's
analysis in either case. In the end, the Roncker reasoning may be more
compelling because in that case the restrictive program was a completely
segregated program. By permitting Neill Roncker to be integrated with
non-handicapped children, the Sixth Circuit complied with both the
letter and the spirit of the Act.
Although the "least restrictive environment" had truly noble roots
at the inception of the Act, 193 there are additional unspoken factors
working against the least restrictive environment which underlie the
educational system as it exists today. Educators may oppose the
application of the least restrictive environment because they fear that
the presence of handicapped children in their mainstream classrooms
will lower the standard of education for all students. 194 Although this
concern may spring from altruistic intentions, often educators' salary
increases are tied to their students' performance on standardized tests.
191.
Grace I.
192.
193.
194.
tion, 8 J.

See supra notes 62-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of Grace I and
See supra notes 79-101 for a discussion of Roncker.
See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
Steve Heise, Comment, Mainstreaming of Handicapped Children in EducaJuv. L. 105, 112 (1984) [hereinafter Heise Comment].
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Some educators and parents also may believe that a classroom teacher
is not qualified to be both classroom teacher and "special education"
teacher. 95 Another systemic problem may be that the least restrictive
environment focus is on the individual child, which conflicts with the
public education goal of mass education of large numbers of children.'9
Parents may oppose their child's return to the regular classroom with
skepticism because that was probably the place where their child failed
initially.197 Additionally, it is understandable that parents may prefer
to keep their children in a safe, homogeneous program in which their
children have enjoyed relative success. Some special education programs
foster student-teacher relationships which are almost family-like. Many
special education students are physically, educationally and emotionally
needy, and justifiably rely on special educators who are extremely
dedicated people. It is difficult for both parents and students when
students must leave this type of nurturing environment. Finally, "in
implementing least restrictive environment, the courts have not focused
on the creation of appropriate educational placements, only on the
selection of one of two available choices."' 98
One of the most compelling factors undermining the success of
the "least restrictive environment" is that by use of the "minimal
benefit" standard of Rowley, school districts can force mainstreaming
when it is not in the child's best interest. 99 Schools can also use Rowley
to reduce existing special education services and expenses. 2° While it is
clearly objectionable to "warehouse" a handicapped child in a mainstream classroom (even at the parent's request), it is just as objectionable to encourage that placement under the guise of "least restrictive
environment" when that placement lacks supportive and related services .201 Parents may find themselves reluctantly choosing between mainstreaming and services. 2°2
195. Id.

196. Turnbull, supra note 7, at 167.
197. Will, supra note 117, at 10.

198. Turnbull supra note 7, at 199 (emphasis added).
199. Heise Comment, supra note 194, at 111.

200. Id.; Michael S. Treppa, The EHA: Trends and Problems with "Related
Services" Provisions, 18 GoLDEN GAT U.L. REv. 427, 440 (1988).

201. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1991). The Act defines
"related services" as:
(17) .

.

. transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other

supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psychological

services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and
counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, except that such med-

ical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
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These problems lie at the heart of the controversey surrounding
the Regular Education Initiative, developed four years ago, and other
"inclusion" programs. 302 The Regular Education Initiative and "inclusion" programs are programs developed out of the philosophy that all
special education children should be. educated in their neighborhood
school, and regular classroom. °4 "[T]his has primarily meant integrating children from institutions and special schools in regular schools; in
other places it has moved children from special classes and resource
teacher programs into full time regular class placement.''205 The underlying premise of some inclusion programs is that such "inclusion" is
itself a form of educational benefit, generally social in nature, to
handicapped children.208 Unfortunately, when these students are "mainstreamed" based on a school district's categorical policy of inclusion
or Regular Education Initiative, these students may also lose their
"individualized" programming required by the Act.
Critics of the Regular Education Initiative argue that, among other
things, it is illogical to believe that regular education teachers can
improve their overall class performance while providing individualized
programs to an ever-increasing number of low performing students. 2°7
These critics also recognize that the special education model is still in
its infancy, and it is wrong to abandon it "just at a time when-hundreds
of thousands of drug-affected children will be entering school.''208
Finally, these critics note that the Regular Education Initiative may
violate the Act by failing to provide a continuum of alternative
20 9
placements based on students' individualized needs.
Id.

required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.
202. Martin, supra note 35, at 4.

203. See generally, Will, supra note 117; see also, LaNelle Gallagher, Statement
on the Regular EducationInitiative, 26 LEARNING DisABmrris AssociATION NEWSBR, FS,
May/June, 1991, at 1. The propositions in the Will paper, which encouraged the return
of special education students to the regular classroom, has been named the Regular
Education Initiative. Gallagher at 1. See generally Freagon, supra note 1 for a
description of the prototype "inclusion" program. "Inclusion" programs seek to place
all special education students at the school and in the classroom they would normally
attend were they not identified as having disabilities. Freagon at 21.
204. Barbara Bateman, LDA-REI-LRE, 26 LEARNING DisABnrms ASSOCIATION
NEWSBREFS, Jan., 1991, at 3.
205. Id.

206. See generally Freagon supra note 1 (calling for "one integrated quality
educational system for all students" in order to address the isolation and rejection
handicapped students feel when they are segregated from their non-handicapped peers).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id; see also, Letter from LaNelle S. Gallagher to President Bush (Aug. 14,
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In this context, the Supreme Court must respect the preference
that some educators and parents have for educational methodologies
which are not in the least restrictive environment, or that some handicapping conditions requiremore restrictive settings. 10 The goal of "least
restrictive environment" should not "trump all other considerations,"2"'
but should be "secondary to the paramount goal of the Act to provide
an appropriate education that meets the unique needs of each handicapped child, decided upon through an individualized process.' '212 To
this end, the choice of the parents, in and of itself, should be given
positive weight in a multi-factor analysis, particularly when the parents
have supported their choice with expert testimony regarding the efficacy
of the methodology they have proposed, or when the student himself
opts for greater restriction. By recognizing the parents' wishes as a
factor in this analysis, the Court would acknowledge the fact that
parental and student support of the student's program is crucial to the
student's success in that program.
The Court must also ensure that the "mainstreaming" requirement
posesses equal weight regardless of its proponent. It is inequitable that
under the Regular Education Initiative, school districts may rely on the
preference for mainstreaming to move children into regular classrooms,
yet case law has established that parents cannot equally rely.2 13 In each
of these cases, one level of the state administrative hearings had agreed
1991). Ms. Gallagher, President of Learning Disabilities Association of America, warned
that the Regular Education Initiative may be "no more than [a] thinly veiled budget
cutting strateg[y] designed to reduce expenditures for students with disabilities ....

If

students with disabilities require special education outside the regular classroom, in
order to receive an education which is appropriate to his or her individual needs, the
law requires that education reform initiatives accomodate this need." Id.
210. For a thought-provoking article on how the least restrictive environment has
worked to the disadvantage of some deaf students, gee generally, Dubow, supra note
1.
211. Id. at 223 (quoting Geis v. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 1985).
212. Id. at 227. When viewed together, these beliefs and concerns may suggest the
unfortunate view that the "better" program can never be accomplished in a lesser
restrictive setting. Some educators are shirking their responsibility to be "creative"
when developing individualized programs in lesser-restrictive settings, and some parents
obligingly believe those educators when they are told that their child's program cannot
be duplicated in a lesser-restrictive setting. Parents may accept the proposal by the
schools as the "only" way their child will receive special education. Due to ignorance
or intimidation, many parents never question their child's IEP or placement. Worse
yet, some parents never even read their child's IEP.
213. See Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1991); Schuldt
v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Dist. 77, 937 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1991); see also supra notes
144-73 and accompanying text.
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with the parents, so that by adding the factors of deference to the state
hearings, the preference for mainstreaming, and the choice of the
parents, the choice of the greater restrictive programs offered by the
school districts could have been overcome.
Finally, the Court should require that school districts support their
decisions to offer only segregated or centralized programs as reasonable
choices of educational methodology. 1 4 A school district could sustain
this burden by offering proof that 1) it can economize costs by
centralizing its staff, 2) the centralized program is needed because of a
sufficient number of students with similar needs, 3) the students would
not receive educational benefit elsewhere because their needs are unique,
or 4) these unique needs can best be met in a segregated setting. In
order to comply with the "individualized" nature of the Act, school
districts would have to sustain this burden for each child, individually.
Although this is a heavy burden for school districts to bear, recall that
school districts may permissibly argue that prohibitive cost confines
their choice to a centralized program. The Court, however, must not
permit school districts to rely on physical access alone as a choice of
educationalmethodology. By restricting this argument, the Court would
require school districts to justify their decisions to centralize with
legitimate methodological arguments, or prohibitive cost arguments.
Without that requirement, school districts could indefinitely avoid the
"least restrictive environment" provision without justification.

V.

RECOMNMNDATIONS

This author recommends that in cases where "mainstreaming" is
the only issue, a two-step test should be applied. First, it must be
determined whether both of the proposed programs meet the Rowley
test for "appropriateness." If so, a factor test should then be applied
to determine which level of restriction is appropriate for this individual
child. Courts should consider the following factors: the decisions of
the state administrative agencies; the congressional preference for mainstreaming; cost when argued; and the choice of the parents or the
student himself. It is not suggested that any of these factors be given
a predetermined or precise weight, for the "individualized" nature of
the Act requires that each case be analyzed based on its individual
merits. Although school districts may try to fit handicapped students
into preexisting special education programs, each handicapped student

214. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text distinguishing methodology
from mainstreaming.
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is unique. The Act has acknowledged this fact by requiring an "individualized educational program."
In order to maintain flexibility, this factor test should be applied
as a totality of the circumstances test. Courts must be able to establish
the relative weights of these factors on a case-by-case basis, for each
individual child, and no factor alone should be dispositive. For example,
courts should be able to refuse mainstreaming when opposed by both
the parents and the student if the court believes that this opposition
would result in the student's failure in the mainstream program. Just
as categorical placements by the school based on handicapping condition alone violates the Act, so too does categorical mainstreaming, even
under the name of "inclusion" or Regular Education Initiative.
VI.

CONCLUSION .

Although decision-making in mainstreaming cases may be clearcut when programs differ significantly on either the level of appropriateness or degree of restriction, clear choices disappear when school
districts (and hopefully parents and courts) creatively fill the interstices
of the continuum of special education placements. For example, the
differences become blurred when evaluating the differences between
placement in a mainstream classroom with special education services in
a resource room, and a special education classroom with intermittent
mainstreaming. Most likely each program is "appropriate" under the
Rowley test, and the level of mainstreaming is nearly identical. 215
Notwithstanding the preference for mainstreaming in a situation like
this, it may be important to choose the program advocated by the
parents and/or the handicapped child. 216
The Supreme Court should acknowledge the potential misuses of
the mainstream provision (both by the parents and by the school
districts), and establish a factor test which includes deference to the
state educational agencies, prohibitive cost, the preference for mainstreaming, and the choice of the parents or student. Additionally, this
test must insure that the "mainstreaming" argument has equal weight
when advanced by either the school district or by the parents. Categorical placements in either segregated programs or in the regular classroom
215. For an excellent factual presentation of circumstances actually facing educators, parents and judges making decisions in special education today, see Gillette v.
Fairland Bd. of Educ., 725 F.Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
216. Bonadonna v. Cooperman, 619 F. Supp. 401, 412 (D.C.N.J. 1985) ("It is

my philosophy that a child will do best when the parents support the program the child

is in," (quoting Ms. Gorsky, a specialist in teaching and hearing impaired, record at
22)).
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under "inclusion" must be prohibited to protect each child's individualized needs. In this way, school districts will be forced to creatively
fill the gaps along the continuum of special education placements,
satisfying the congressional goals of the Act and meeting the individualized educational needs of the students they serve.
LINDA S. ABRAHAMSON

